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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
UTAIJ COfPE..R CQ¥f1\.NY, 
A Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMIS- :No. 3582. 
SION OF UTAH, and Certiorari Proceedings. 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT 
COMPANY, a Corporation, 
Defendants. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING AND ARGUMENT IN 
SUPPORT THEREOF. 
DICKSON, ELLIS, LUCAS & ADAMSON, 
Attorneys for Petitioner. 
In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
UTAH COPPER COMPANY, 
A Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMIS-
SION OF UTAH, and 
UTAH POvVER & LIGHT 
COMPANY, a Corporation, 
Defendants. 
No. 3582. 
Certiorari Pro,ceedings. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING AND ARGUMENT IN 
SUPPORT THEREOF. 
To the Ilonorable Supreme Court of the Sta;te of Utah: 
The Utah Copper Company, plaintiff above named, 
respectfully petitions this Honorable Court to grant a 
rehearing of the above matter upon the following 
grounds, and with respect to the following matters, not 
passed upon, nor determined, by the opinion and deci-
sion of this Court : 
I. 
This Honorable Court, in its opinion and decision 
herein, misconceived and overlooked the effect of the ac-
tion of the Public Utilities Commission of Utah in mak-
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ing applicable to the contract between the Utah Power 
& Light Company and this petitioner, the published 
schedule rates on file with the said Utilities Commission 
from the effective date of the Commission's order and 
until it should, in another proceeding pending before it, 
determine whether or not such published schedule rates 
so made applicable to petitioner's contract were fair, 
just and reasonable. 
II. 
This Honorable Court in its opmwn and decision 
herein misconceived and overlooked the questions pre-
sented by the specifications numbered 12, 41, 43 and 53 
of the application of the Utah Copper Company for a re-
he:uing before the Public Utilities Commission, the same 
being embraced in Exhibit "N," attached to the Petition 
for Certiorari herein, in that and because this Honorable 
Court failed to differentiate between the reasonableness 
of the increases in power rates sought by the Power 
Company, as distinguished from the reasonableness of 
the rates named in tho then existing schedules. 
III. 
The contention of petitioner in these respects was, 
and is, that the Utilities Commission had no power or 
jurisdiction to make applicable to petitioner's contract 
any rates other than the contract rates, unless and until 
it should, upon proper proceedings and upon full and 
eornplete hearing, first ascertain and determine that the 
schedule rates to be made applicable to the service rend-
ered petitioner were fair, just and reasonable, and make 
the finding of fact in that respect as specifically required 
by Sections 4800 and 4830 of the Compiled Laws of Utah, 
1917. 
IV. 
If petitioner's claim and contention be correct, then 
it follows that any application of the published schedule 
rates made by the Commission prior to the date upon 
which the said schedule rates might be held to be fair, 
just and reasonable, and any making of such rates retro-
active from the date on which the Commission should 
determine the same to be fair, just and reasonable and 
applicable to petitioner's contract from the date of the 
Commission's order herein, would and does amount to a 
confiscation of petitioner's property, and a taking there-
of without due process of law, and a denial of the equal 
protection of the law, in violation of the provisions of the 
14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States. 
v. 
The order made by the Utilities Commission herein 
should have been e·ffective only from the date when by its 
order in Case No. 248, then and now pending before it, it 
should determine that the said published schedule rates 
were and are fair, just and reasonable and proper to be 
applied to petitioner's contract for power service, but 
it appears from the decision and order made by sruid 
Commission in said proceeding involved in Case No. 248, 
that it affirmatively found and determined that the said 
published schedule rates herein were not fair, just and 
reasonable, and therefore should not be made applicable 
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to the service rendered this petitioner effective upon any 
date whatever, and found that a reasonable rate applic-
able to the service rendered this petitioner was less than 
that prescribed in the existing published schedules when 
said order was made. 
VI. 
Further it appears in the record herein that all pro-
ceedings had in said Case No. 248 became, were and are 
embraced within and part of the record herein, and it fur-
ther appears from said record and the order made therein 
and herein that the rates and schedules which said Com-
mission found to be fair, just and reasonable were held 
by said Commission, not only applicable to the service 
rendered this petitioner, but also that the said rates 
should be applicable by retroactive effect as of and from 
noon of the 22d day of October, 1920, the date upon which 
the order of said Commission herein became effective. 
Your petitioner therefore claims and asserts that the 
action of the Commission in making said rates applicable, 
as aforesaid, as of and from noon of the said 22d day 
of October, 1920, results in, and amounts to, a confisca-
tion of petitioner's property, and a taking thereof, with-
out due process of law, and a denial of the equal protec-
tion of the law in violation of the 14th Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States. 
VII. 
This petition is filed herein without in any way waiv-
ing petitioner's right to maintain, assert and contend in 
any proper tribunal, of either original or appellate jur-
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isdiction, that the judgment, decision and order of this 
Honorable Court herein is erroneous, null, void and of 
no force and effect so far as the rights of this petitioner 
are concerned. 
Wherefore, your petitioner respectfully prays that 
this Honorable Court do grant a rehearing herein, and 
hear further argument upon the points and questions 
hereby presented, and thereupon modify the judgment 
heretofore by this Honorable Court rendered herein, and 
reverse, set aside and annul said order of said Commis-
sion. 
Dated this 16th day of March, A. D. 1921. 
DICKSON, ELLIS, LUCAS & ADAMSON, 
Attorneys for Petitioner. 
ARGUMENT. 
The argument in support of petitioner's claim a8 
presented by the questions set forth in the foregoing pe-
tition, is embodied in our original brief herein at pages 
178 to 205, both inclusive. We shall not attempt to repeat 
that argument at length, but earnestly urge the Court 
to read and consider that argument because it would 
seem from the opinion and decision of the Court herein 
that the Court entirely misconceived the question of law 
presented and entirely misconceived the state of facts 
upon ·which the same was based. 
At the time the Commission made the order herein 
under review, the Power Company had certain then exist-
ing filed and published schedules. The Power Company 
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had also applied to the Commission for leave to file new 
schedules whereby its rates might be increased over, not 
only the rates named in the special contract, but also over 
the rates named in the then existing schedules. The 
Court clearly was confused as to the facts in the case. 
The Court's opinion says that: 
''Nor is the question regarding the extent the 
rates should be modified or increased, if at all, in-
volved here. It may be, as suggested by counsel, 
that the Power Company is demanding a greater 
increase in rates than it is entitled to. That ques-
tion, however, is still pending before the Commis-
sion and we must assume that the Commission 
will not permit the Power Company to impose 
upon the public by granting it the right to charge 
and collect excessive rates, or rates that are higher 
than will enable it to effectuate the purpose for 
which it is created and to adequately serve the pub-
lic. Nor can we assume that the Commission will 
permit the Power Company to inflate the value of 
its properties with a view of enabling its stock-· 
holders to realize large profits upon their stock. 
All of these matters must be determined by the 
Commission, and in discharging its duties in that 
regard, in view of the abnormal conditions 0xi :ot-
ing, the greatest care must, and no doubt will, be 
exercised to prevent injury to the public or to the 
public utility." 
That was not the question presented. It was not a 
question as to whether the Power Company should be 
granted an increase of rates such as it sought. It was 
not a question of whether the Power Company would be 
permitted, through tJ;Ie instrumentality of new schedules, 
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to collect excessive rates. It was a question as to the 
reasonableness of the then existing schedule rates as ap-
plied to the service rendered this petitioner under the 
contract interfered with. In short, the question was 
whether or not the Commission could make an order di-
recting a consumer to pay a rate which the Commission 
had never found to be reasonable, fair or just, in the face 
of a contention by the consumer that the existing schedule 
rates were unreasonable; unjust, unfair, oppressive and 
confiscatory. Stated in another way, the question was, 
whether the Commission had any power to make an order 
putting a consumer on a new rate schedule, without pass-
ing upon that issue presented by the consumer. Our stat-
ute specifically required that issue to be passed upon and 
a finding of fact made with respect to it. Petitioner's 
right to due process of law required that issue to be 
passed upon and a finding of fact made with respect to it. 
Yet, the Commission never passed upon that issue, and 
never made any finding of fact that the then existing 
schedule rates were reasonable, fair or just, as applied to 
the service rendered petitioner. On the contrary, its 
order and opinion affirmatively showed that it had never 
determined that issue; and now, by the last order of the 
Commission (of which this Court, under our statutes, 
can take judicial notice), it appears that the Commission 
has fomld that the rates which it first ordered the con-
sumers to pay, were unreasonable, unfair and unjust, 
because the rates which the Commission finds would be 
fair and just are less than those in the then, or now, exist-
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mg schedule. Not only did the Commission deny the 
Power Company the rate increase it sought, but it fixed 
the schedule for petitioner's service providing rates less 
than those which were in effect under the existing sched-
ules at the time the order was made interfering with the 
contract. It may be within the police power of the state 
to set aside a contract and fix reasonable rates to be paid 
by the contract consumer, but it is not within the police 
power of the state to set aside a contract and compel the 
consumer to pay, either temporarily or permanently, 
either an unreasonable rate, or a rate which the Commis-
sion had never found to be reasonable, and which the 
Legislature had never declared to be reasonable. 
vVe respectfully submit that the Commission, under 
the facts in the record herein, had no power or authority 
to make its order herein effective as of any date prior 
to the determination that the rates imposed were fair, 
just and reasonable and that its order in Case No. 248, 
made applicable herein, whereby it imposes upon peti-
tioner the obligation to pay the rates prescribed in its 
order in Case No. 248, from the 22nd day of October, 
1920, was, and is, void and of no effect, but that the only 
power invested in said Commission was, and is, to cause 
the rates, declared by it to be fair, just and reasonable, 
to be payable, for electrical energy taken by petitioner, 
only from and after the effective date of said order so 
made in said Case No. 248, to-wit, from and after the 
22nd day of March, 1921. It is not permissible for the 
Commission to make its order retroactive. The effect 
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of the Commission's order is, and will be, to require your 
petitioner to pay over to the Power Company, for electri-
cal energy received by it, between the said 22nd day of 
October, 1920, and the effective date of the order of the 
Commission in Case No. 248, namely, March 22, 1921, 
an amount in excess of $225,000.00, and during all of this 
time it had not been ascertained or determined that the 
rates so made retroactive were in any respect fair, just 
or reasonable. 
vVe submit that the Commission's order in the re-
spects herein referred to is unconstitutional, illegal and 
void, and amounts to a taking of petitioner's property 
without due process of law and denies to petitioner the 
equal protection of the law in violation of the provisions 
of the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United 
States. 
We respectfully submit, therefore, that the opinion 
and judgment of this Honorable Court should be so modi-
fied herein as to hold that no order made by the Commis-
sion should, or shall, become effective upon any date 
prior to that upon which the said Commission shall de-
termine by its decision and finding that the rates fixed by 
it and to be charged for electrical energy furnished to 
your petitioner by the Power Company are fair, just and 
reasonable, and that the order of said Commission should 
be reversed, set aside, vacated and annulled. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DICKSON, ELLIS, LUCAS & ADAMSON, 
Attorneys for Petitioner. 
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We, attorneys for the plaintiff and petitioner herein, 
do hereby certify that in our opinion there is good reason 
to believe that judgment in the above entitled matter is 
erroneous in the respects set forth in the foregoing peti-
tion for rehearing, and that said cause ought to be re-
examined. 
